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BEHIND THE SILKEN CURT-IN. By Bartley C. Crum. New York: Simon and
Shuster, 1947. Pp. 297.
PALESTINE MissioN. By Richard Crossman. New York and London: Harper
and Bros., 1947. Pp. 205.
IN the long and dreary record of what the world has done to the Jews who
live and die in it, these two little books will be a sketchy footnote. As an
explanation of the predetermined fate of the ill-starred Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry, they unfold a tragic tale of hypocrisy and power
politics with minor overtones of sincerity and disillusionment.
The Committee itself was a brief episode in post-war Palestine history,
with little relation to what had preceded or has followed it. It vas a straw at
which a harried Labor Government grasped in a desperate effort to gain time.
Time for what? Committed up to its neck with regard to Palestine by prom-
ises it found impossible to keep, the Labor Party had but one program-to
stall just for time itself. So far as Mr. Bevin was concerned, his policy ap-
peared to be one of improvisation, for which he had decided talents. Since
1939, the White Paper had been a festering sore in Britain's Middle East
policy: there was the Arab disaffection during the war, British interest in the
oil of Iraq, trouble in India and Egypt, and increasing violence in Palestine.
Mr. Attlee could no more afford to preside over the liquidation of the British
Empire than could his predecessor, nor had he any more intention of volun-
tarily doing so.
But the White Paper was a plain repudiation of the League of Nations
Mandate for the execution of which Great Britain was responsible as the
Mandatory power. Moreover, the United States might be regarded as having
a legal as well as a political interest in the Iandatory's performance inasmuch
as the Convention of 1924 in substance made this government one of the prin-
cipals to which Britain was accountable for the discharge of her responsi-
bilities. The rising resentment in America and the enormous increase of
Zionist sympathy after the war had needled the President into making a public
demand for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Pales-
tine. Mr. Attlee's proposal for a joint committee to investigate the facts,
perfectly well known to both governments, had the certain advantage of gain-
ing time and the possible one of involving the American Government in the
Mandatory's responsibilities. Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin were also thoroughly
sensitive to the stake which American aviation and oil interests had in the
Middle East. Mr. Truman, having made his demand for the 100,000 in a
loud voice, agreed to the British dilatory proposal in a soft one.
Both Crum and Crossman tell vividly the story of law, morality and justice
caught in a network of imperialist aspirations of three great world powers,
the story of a great humanitarian ideal smothered by the ruthless force of
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dollar diplomacy. Here is the living tale of a dead issue-the issue of justice
for Palestine and the thousands of European Jews whose sole passion in what
is left of life is to exercise their legal right to go to Palestine. A timid Presi-
dent and perfidious State Department1 on the one hand, a desperate Foreign
Minister with a savagely anti-Jewish Colonial Office on the other, have prob-
ably ended forever the chances for a just solution of the problem.
Both books follow the same pattern. They outline in chronological order
the Committee hearings in Washington and London, recount experiences of
the Committee members in Europe, Cairo, Jerusalem, and finally Lausanne
where the report was drafted. Crum's book is definitely pro-Zionist, Cross-
man's pro-Arabic. In spite of the difference in bias, both believe that the
practical solution is partition, a recommendation which the Committee itself
would not endorse. Both writers are realistic and see the human problem
against its sordid background of politics, oil, and a disintegrating empire, with
this difference-it is Crossman's empire that is going to pieces.
From Crum's book one obtains a sharp impression of a conscientious and
sincere man striving to think his way through the tangled intrigue and cun-
ning propaganda which has so enveloped Palestine as almost to obscure the
real issues concerning that unhappy land. Here also is the acute pain and dis-
appointment which accompanied rejection by two governments of the unani-
mous recommendations of a group of distinguished citizens of both countries
who devoted four months of their lives attempting to solve one of the world's
toughest problems. There is something of the same feeling about Crossman's
book although, in spite of the Foreign Minister's commitment to do every-
thing in his power to carry out a unanimous report, there were fewer illusions
among the British members about the good faith of either government than on
the part of the American members of the group.
Crum accepts the water-tight legal and moral case of the Jews and sees
through the synthetic opposition of the Arab world. The problem of Pales-
tine, he thinks, has been made unnecessarily complicated. He is convinced
that, were it not for the influence of British administrators and the small
group of Arab faxhilies who act as feudal overloads, Jew and Arab would live
and work together in peace. Indeed, despite obstacles created by special inter-
ests, they are doing so now. He is confident of the ultimate success of the
Jewish experiment in Palestine moderated perhaps by political compromises
imposed by other nations. He believes in the formulation of a definite Ameri-
can policy notwithstanding the Committee's failure. Basically this policy
must be one of two alternatives: either to support "the forces of reaction who
prop up feudalistic regimes in the Arab States" or to back "the progressive
1. Although Crossman appears to accuse President Roosevelt of talking to the
Arabs and Jews out of different sides of his mouth (pp. 44-5), Crum attributes the du-
plicity of American policy to the State Department and appears to have the evidence to
support his conclusions (pp. 36-41).
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forces in the Middle East."2 He believes that "support for the Jewish Na-
tional Home is the first and logical step to take on the path toward the ad-
vancement of a democratic way of life in that area of the world.".3
Throughout Crossman's anti-jewish pages on the other hand there is con-
stant effort to build up the Arabs' phoney case for Palestine. The effort fails
as does the case. Indeed, there is no case and for all his pains Crossman can-
not produce one. Unlike Crum, he recognizes the contradictions of Zionism;
nevertheless, he appears to accept the equally anomalous Arab nationalism and
is not troubled by the spectacle of six Arab States acting as spokesman for
and identifying their interests with the people who have a genuine and legiti-
mate concern in the political destinies of Palestine.
"Western imperialism" is the Arab charge against the Jew. "The Zionist,
the new Jew," says Azzam Pashe, speaking for the Arab League, "wants to
dominate and he pretends that he has got a particularly civilizing mission ...
the Arabs simply stand and say 'no.' We are not going to allow ourselves to
be controlled either by great nations or small nations or dispersed nations."4
"I have no doubt," comments Crossman, "that he had spoken for the v'hole
Arab world. He had put to us an argument which, if it were accepted, would
cut away, at a single stroke, the whole Jewish case."3
It is not easy to understand how a man with a grasp of the realities of the
Middle East should be so impressed with the Arab position. Yet Crossman
writes, as he apparently acted on the Committee, with an intelligent sense of
the responsibilities which that body had a right to assume were theirs. As an
Englishman, it is perhaps understandable that he cannot excuse Jewish leader-
ship for refusing to follow the moderate policy of that other loyal English-
man, Weizmann, who struggled so long to obtain complete collaboration be-
tween the Jewish Agency and Great Britain. Crossman also accurately senses
the weakness of the Zionist position in failing to make a definite decision
either to negotiate in good faith or to resort to all-out revolution together with
the Irgun and the Stern Group. Like Crum and the other members of the
Committee, Crossman struggled both with his conscience and his colleagues
for a unanimous report and thought the results achieved both a palliative to
relieve immediate tension and a basis for eventual solution.
The two books together constitute an ironic preface to the appointment of
the new international commission to rediscover all over again the matters re-
ported by the Crum-Crossman group. In the meantime, as the Committee's
report is filed along with many other similar reports, the small remaining
segment of European Jewry can prepare to face another winter in the camps






t Visiting Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY. By Randolph E. Paul. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1947. Pp. 448. $4.00.
AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIV TAXATION. By William Vickrey. New York: The
Ronald Press Company, 1947. Pp. 496. $4.75.
THE notion that taxation can have any other than an inverse relation to
prosperity or that it should be made more, rather than less, progressive may
not enjoy legislative favor today, but it nevertheless-indeed, for that very
reason-desperately needs spokesmen. Randolph Paul's Taxaton, for Pros-
perity and William Vickrey's Agenda for Progressive Taxation go far toward
answering that need. Mr. Paul, drawing on his experience as practitioner,
public servant, writer, and teacher, gives us, along with a useful account of re-
cent tax history, a vigorous and popular statement of how we can tax for
prosperity, while Mr. Vickrey, writing more for the technician, details the re-
forms that are urgently needed to prevent dissipation of the progressive aspect
of our tax structure, and advances in addition an alternative system of taxing
income and inheritance which lawyers and economists will want to study care-
fully. Together the books could be a sound corrective to the growing fever
for such anti-progressive steps as sharp cuts in individual surtax rates (with-
out raising the pitifully low exemptions or materially reducing the initial
rates), elimination of the tax on capital gains, abandonment of federal gift and
estate taxation, and granting other relief to those who least need it. Such a
corrective is especially necessary now that the chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee has appointed a tax advisory group which, however
eminent and fair-minded its members may be, is not representative of the
public. Its appointment is an unexplained break with established practice:
Committees of Congress ordinarily offer interested persons and groups an op-
portunity to present their views as advocate-witnesses, but depend on their
staffs to supply the "unbiased analysis" of tax problems which is said to be
the assigned task of this advisory group. Since several of the group's members
have been associated with the Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, the Twin
Cities Tax Plan, and the NAM's Tax Committee, it is especially to be hoped
that the views of Paul arid Vickrey will receive a hearing.
Paul commences with history, taking as his starting point the polar argu-
ments of Joseph H. Choate and James C. Carter in Pollock v. United States,
but passing quickly to the "peaceful revolution" wrought in the American fis-
cal structure by the Sixteenth Amendment. When President Taft proposed
the amendment in 1909, many welcomed it as an inexpensive way to appease
the insurgent Republicans who had joined with the Democrats to demand a
new federal income tax. They must have been first dismayed by the alacrity
of Congress and the States in adopting the amendment and then horrified as
the individual income tax became our "fiscal beast of burden." Paul sketches
the developments of succeeding decades 'primarily with an eye to executive-
legislative jockeying in the tax-making process and with emphasis, quite natu-
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rally, on New Deal and wartime developments. Although his review lacks the
detail of Ratner's Aerican Taxation, it encompasses later years and is a con-
venient outline for the non-specialist.
But the heart of Paul's book is his sturdy insistence on the affirmative eco-
nomic role of taxation: "It would be madness to impose taxes for revenue
only and with blind disregard for their social and economic consequences.
. . . It is the highest function of taxes to accomplish positive social or eco-
nomic objectives beyond the revenue."' Of course few would be so hardy as
to deny that taxation affects saving, consumption and other economic patterns,
though no doubt there are still those who hope that these effects can be mini-
mized by averting the eye or by calling them "indirect." Paul's contribution is
a demand that we bring such results out of the realm of the subconscious or
accidental and that we levy taxes not only to raise revenue but also quite de-
liberately to achieve the community's social and economic goals. "We must
first determine our social and economic objectives, and then decide which
taxes will lead us to our goals."2 The objectives to which Paul would harness
taxation are familiar: achievement of full employment and a high level of na-
tional income, and the prevention of undue concentration of wealth. To insure
full employment, the rates of income and social security taxes must be ad-
justed so as to curb inflation in one phase of the business cycle, and so as to
expand purchasing power and stimulate lagging investment in the other. The
function of checking undue concentration of wealth is served by estate and
gift taxation and by progressive graduation of the income tax.
Except that the use of taxation as a contra-cyclical force is of recent origin,
Paul's thesis is not novel. Throughout our history excise taxes have been
levied on commodities which the community has thought-rightly or wrongly
-- deleterious or dispensable. Many advocates of federal death taxation have
desired not so much to raise revenue as to restrict the transmission of "for-
tunes swollen beyond all healthy limits," to use Theodore Roosevel's phrase.3
Indeed, some taxes would have been a failure in the eyes of their authors if
they had produced any revenue; state bank notes and yellow oleomargarine
and machine guns prove that a tax can destroy, in fact as well as in rhetoric
and even while the Supreme Court sits. Yet despite ample historical buttress
for Paul's views, there lingers a feeling that it is morally reprehensible to
introduce non-revenue considerations into the tax structure. A recent ex-
ample is the outcry against the punitive tax treatment of black market prices
and of profits made in violation of the anti-trust laws.
TMr. Paul accompanies his credo with a bill of particulars too detailed to
summarize. It may be noted in passing that he is not impressed by the asser-
tion that taxing capital gains depresses investment, that he favors more lenient
treatment of capital losses, that he would permit the income of closely held
1. Pp. 215-7.
2. P. 217.
3. RATNra, A-mmcAx TAXATION 260 (1942).
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,corporations to be reported as though the stockholders were partners, that hie
would allow larger corporations some credit for distribtuted earnings and, in
recessions, for new capital outlays, that he would meet part of the costs of the
social security program by government contribution rather than by payroll
taxes, and that he would raise rates, lower exemptions and close loopholes in
the federal estate and gift taxes. Specific issues are treated in a broad and
nontechnical fashion which will make up in appeal to the general practitioner
and interested layman what it loses in precision for the specialist.
Since Paul gives us so much, it is perhaps captious to ask for more, Yet
there would have been profit in a fuller discussion of the thorny question of
tax incidence and shifting. The awkward fact that a tax is not necessarily
borne by the person who pays it threatens every effort to affect behavior (sav-
ings, investment, consumption, or whatever) through tax burdens or conces-
sions. So far as the tax or the concession is shifted, the desired end will not
materialize. Even if an economic lag results in short-run achievements, it may
be that lasting effects will require more frequent and more ample doses of the
prescribed medicine. Moreover, Mr. Paul constantly refers to "ability to pay"
as a criterion of a fair tax program without indicating how this test-an emo-
tionally satisfying goal in distributing the burden of a tax levied to raise rev-
enue-can be of service when the aim of a tax is, for example, to curb infla-
tion. If a tax is successfully to restrict purchases, must it not look less to the
taxpayer's ability to pay than to his propensity to consume? If one is seeking
to stimulate investment, should concessions be made to potential investors
even though they may be more able to pay taxes than their fellow citizens?
Another issue: Beardsley Ruml, never one to boggle at the unorthodox, has
gone far beyond Paul to assert that the federal government can finance itself
without any taxes, and that taxes should be levied oidy for non-revenue pur-
poses. Here again Mr. Paul's views would have been welcomed, and one can-
not but regret that he merely dissents without opinion. Despite these omis-
sions, the book is an excellent presentation of forward looking opinions and
effectively translates the basic questions of policy into language that all can
grasp.
Vickrey has set for himself a task of more modest compass than Paul: the
elucidation of "what must be done to weld our progressive tax structure into
a consitent, workable system, reasonably free from undesirable repercussions
and capable of producing substantial redistribution of income. ' 4 Content to
let others shape policy, he is concerned largely with techniques for making
their decisions effective. This responsibility, never ministerial, has become
staggering as higher rates have elicited and rewarded protean ingenuity on the
part of taxpayers. Yet Vickrey's book is not innocent of major premises; as
the title promises, it is a program for a progressive tax system, though one not
hitched to a particular level of rates. We delude ourselves if we look only to
4. P. iii.
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nominal rates, without regard to devices by which income can be split among
several taxpayers, transmuted into capital gains taxable at lower rates, shifted
from one year to another, or realized in non-taxable form. Contrariwise, it is
equally fallacious to ignore the extent to which taxpayers with irregular in-
come patterns are unable to recoup losses, depreciation, obsolescence, or other
capital impairment when others, perhaps less venturesome, pay no greater
taxes although their net worth is undiminished. When taxation is for revenue
only, imperfections like these interfere with an equitable distribution of the
load; when taxes are designed to achieve fundamental policy objectives, as
Paul urges, imperfections have the additional consequence of frustrating the
community's aims. It is to such imperfections, technical only in the sense that
a carpenter's level or a seaman's compass is technical, that Vickrey addresses
himself in painstaking and helpful fashion.
His discussions of imputed income from assets (owner-occupied homes and
consumer durables), insurance, depreciation and allied deductions, capital gains
and losses, and corporate savings are notably suggestive and, despite a pe-
dantic tendency to treat the trivial as solemnly as the important, deserve a
wide audience. But Vickrey goes beyond a program for reform within our
present framework to propose a spendings tax to displace in part the familiar
income tax, a "cumulative annual averaging" method for assessing either the
income or the spendings tax, and a "bequeathing power succession tax" as a
substitute for the estate and gift taxes. None of these proposals is easy to
understand, and the third in particular is very intricate; moreover, the au-
thor's style is sometimes as opaque as the internal revenue regulations, so that
one is never sure that he has not misunderstood.
Vickrey's faith in the spendings tax is surprising. Certainly if one sub-
scribes to Paul's view that we should set our sights on a high level of national
income, rather than merely on the accumulation of capital, the spendings tax
can hardly be commended. As Vickrey himself concedes, a spendings tax
would respond less flexibly to changes in the economic outlook than does the
income tax and would, moreover, be less effective in curbing the accumulation
of large fortunes. As an emergency measure during serious inflation, the
spendings tax could be useful, as Secretary Morgenthau unsuccessfully ar-
gued before the Senate Finance Committee in 1942, but as a permanent part
of our fiscal structure it would be a retrogressive step.
Vickrey's "cumulative annual averaging" method for assessing either the
income or the spendings tax is a thorough-going attack on our present system
of taxing on the basis of annual accounting periods. Annual accounting no-
toriously discriminates against persons with fluctuating income; its distortions
in this respect are tacitly acknowledged, though only partially corrected, by
existing provisions for the averaging of back pay awards and of lump sum
compensation, the carry-over of capital losses, and the carry-back and carry-
over of net operating losses. Because of the shortcomings of annual ac-
counting, the code has an array of cumbersome artillery to prevent manipula-
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tive shifting of income from high to low tax years: rigid depreciation and
obsolescence regulations, penalty taxes on personal holding companies and
corporations improperly accumulating surplus, disallowance of wash and intra-
family sales, and the like. In spite of these anti-shifting weapons, annual ac-
counting still places an undesirable premium on shrewd timing of capital and
other transactions. Vickrey wants to avoid these defects by making tax liability
independent of the timing of income.
He proposes, in brief, that each year the taxpayer's income be cumulated
from the beginning of his averaging period, that a tax be computed for this
cumulative total, that the sum of the taxes paid in previous years (with inter-
est) be deducted from the liability so computed, and that the difference be
paid as the current tax due. At the end of the averaging period, the taxpayer
would account for accrued but unrealized capital gains and losses. The inter-
ested reader will find this proposal elaborated with great care and attention to
detail. Although it is strewn with complexities, Vickrey may well be on firm
ground in asserting that by sweeping away existing intricacies its net result
would be simplification. The reader of Paul's book quite properly will ask
how cumulative averaging will affect the achievement of desired social objec-
tives through taxation. He will note, for example, that when a taxpayer's in-
come increases abruptly in an inflationary period, averaging will smooth out
the hump, so that his tax liability will not advance as fast as his current in-
come. Vickrey believes, however, that the greater equity attainable under
averaging will warrant the use of higher rates; unfortunately, his discussion
of this crucial issue is meager.
Vickrey's "bequeathing power succession tax" would substitute for the ex-
isting estate and gift tax structure a most original plan to insure that "the tax
burden [will] be exactly the same on the transfer of a given sum from one
individual to another regardless of the number of steps or the channels
through which the transfer is effected, and as nearly as may be regardless of
the time of the transfer."' It does this by putting inter vivos transfers on the
same footing as testamentary transfers, and by graduating the tax not only
according to the size of the taxpayer's estate but also according to the differ-
ence between his age and the age of his transferee. Thus a transfer from a
husband to his wife or another contemporary would be taxed more lightly
than a transfer to his son or grandson; moreover, transfers from father to
son and later from son to grandson would incur the same total liability as an
initial transfer directly to the grandson. The purpose is to create a tax which
will truly reach the transmission of wealth by whatever means from one gen-
eration to the next. Under the present system, of course, there is not only an
unwarranted disparity between inter vivos and testamentary transfers but also
a premium on transfers which bestow the income but not the ownership of
funds on as many successive transferees, of as widely separated generations,
5. P. 224.
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as practicable. The technique by which Vickrey would achieve his desired end
is too elaborate to be discussed or even summarized here, but his effort to cre-
ate an instrument graduated according to age differences is highly to be com-
mended. Aside from its forbidding intricacy, its main drawback is that, like
the existing federal estate tax, it looks to the wealth of the donor rather than
to that of the recipient. After all, it is legatees, rather than their dead testa-
tors, who are the real taxpayers and who enjoy the concentrated economic
control which inheritance taxation seeks to mitigate. Accordingly, a tax in-
creasing as the legatee's receipts (both gifts and bequests) increase would
come closer to the social function of inheritance taxation than does any ex-
isting system. A stimulating proposal looking in this direction is the "acces-
sions" tax suggested by Rudick in the Tax Law Rczieu, several years ago.
Perhaps Vickrey will be attracted to adapt his age differential scheme to an
accessions tax; if the result were not unduly complex, it ought to command
widespread interest.
BoRis I. BrrrKn-
CASES ON CREDIT TRANSAcTIONS. By Wesley A. Sturges. St. Paul, 'Minn.:
West Publishing Co., 1947. Pp. 1020. $7.50.
A REvimw of the third edition of Dean Sturges' casebook must necessarily
be written for two different groups of potential readers. For one, comprised
of persons who are acquainted with the earlier editions, it will suffice merely
to report that the new edition is a revised and improved execution of the ideas
and methods of its predecessors.' These readers will not, in all probability, find
the revisions substantial enough to influence opinions already formed concern-
ing the efficacy of this casebook for teaching purposes. A somewhat broader
analysis may be warranted, however, for the consideration of persons who are
not familiar with the book, and who find themselves, with this reviewer, newly
engaged in teaching law courses covered by some or all of the materials in it.
A beginner's notions of whether and how to adopt a casebook may have some
utility for fellow beginners.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
1. The third edition differs from the second in these respects: 27 text cases added,
30 omitted; 112 text notes and footnotes added (exclusive of those posing new ques-
tions), 23 omitted, 57 revised (usually by the addition of citations to recent material);
88 questions added, seven omitted; four excerpts from the Restatement of Security added;
three law review extracts added, seven omitted; three statute extracts added, one omitted;
two forms and one textbook extract omitted; Uniform Trust Receipts Act added, Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act and Uniform Real and Chattel Mortgage Acts omitted. The
greatest reorganization and revision of material occurs in the sections dealing vith in-
solvency and bankruptcy, mortgages on after-acquired property, and dealers' financing.
The present edition, which utilizes larger type, is 79 pages longer than the second ed-
ition (exclusive of appendix and index).
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Dean Sturges' purposes, methods and organization of material are exten-
sively analyzed in the reviews which greeted the earlier editions.2 His collec-
tion of materials is offered to focus attention upon business dealings and prac-
tices, and to encourage law teachers and students to "deal with commercial
law in terms of commercial doings." The editor's primary purpose is appar-
ently to educate the creditor's counselor through a comprehensive survey and
comparative analysis of the plethora of security devices used in recurring
commercial transactions involving the borrowing and lending of money and
the purchase and sale of property on credit. 4 Indeed, one reviewer was so im-
pressed with this aspect of the materials as to suggest that while a student
steeped in the lore of Sturges would be "a young man who knows where he
is going, and how to get there," he would have to "imbibe [his] ideas of so-
cial valuation (if any,) from other courses than the one on credit transac-
tions." r5
It seems clear, however, that this casebook need not limit so narrowly one's
approach to the study of security transactions. Certainly it incorporates ma-
terial which demonstrates the impossibility of planning transactions so scien-
tifically as to eliminate the factor of judicial predeliction.0 Moreover, a num-
ber of cases are concerned with the problem of disentangling "homemade"
security transactions which would horrify the security counselors However
this may be, a teacher will probably most closely identify himself with the
editor's purpose in attempting thoroughly to familiarize students with the
wide variety of ways in which the creditor may seek to secure himself, and
encouraging them to utilize the available devices interchangeably as indi-
vidual situations warrant.
But the law teacher who seeks to employ Dean Sturges' book to produce
2. First edition: Arnold, 31 COL. L. REv. 734 (1931); Donoghue, 15 MA"Q. L.
REv. 121 (1931); Gess, 19 Ky. L. J. 190 (1931); Hanna, 40 YALE L. J. 495 (1931);
Hayden, 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 251 (1930) ; Hopkins, 1 IDAHo L. J. 204 (1931) ; Isaacs,
44 HARv. L. REv. 880 (1931); Kidd, 29 MICH. L. Rav. 1117 (1931); McLaughlin, 5
TULANE L. REv. 326 (1931); Mechem, 6 WASH. L. REv. 44 (1931); Meriwether, 16 ST.
Louis L. Rv. 183 (1931); Miller, 10 OE. L. REy. 213 (1931); Patterson, 17 A.B.AJ.
402 (1931); Sayre, 16 IowA L. REv. 335 (1931).
Second edition: Hanft, 15 Tax. L. REv. 400 (1937); Keefe, 6 FoRD. L. REv. 347
(1937); Levi, 12 NovaE DAiE LAW. 468 (1937); Poteat, 23 VA. L. REv. 739 (1937);
Ransom, 11 TEmT. L. Q. 452 (1937) ; Ritchie, 46 YALE L. 3. 732 (1937).
3. P.vir.
4. Hanft, Book Review, 15 T.zx. L. Rzv. 400 (1937); Kidd, Book Review, 29 MxcH.
L. RE. 1117 (1931); Meriwether, Book Review, 16 ST. Louis L. Rav. 183 (1931); Pat-
terson, Book Review, 17 A.B.AJ. 402 (1931) ; Ransom, Book Review, 11 Tarn, L. Q.
452 (1937).
5. Patterson, 17 A.B.A.J. 402, 403 (1931).
6. For example, see the cases dealing with sole and unconditional ownership clauses
in fire insurance policies, pp. 294, 324, 350.
7. For example, see generally pp. 303-41. One reviewer has suggested, however,
that the editor means to encourage the counselor to make even such unorthodox deviceg
part of his stock in trade. Hanft, 15 TEx. L. REv. 400 (1937).
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lawyers qualified to participate in the policy-making function of selecting par-
ticular security devices for specific purposes will encounter serious difficulty.
The editor has provided no information about business practices and prob-
lems in relevant fields of commercial activity. Thus, for example, classroom
discussion of the comparative utility of the chattel mortgage and the condi-
tional sale for securing the seller of durable consumers' goods must proceed
without reference to the impact of each on contemporary business activities.
Perhaps when the student is later sitting across the desk from a man who
lends money or sells property on credit, he may expect his client to keep these
practical considerations in the forefront in policy discussions. This thought
offers little solace, however, to the teacher wishing to present a functional analy-
sis of the lawyer's problems arising out of security transactions. He must con-
tinue to work in the traditional law school vacuum, and to train mere legal
theorists, unless and until he supplements this casebook with his ovn non-legal
information.
Another difficulty in using Dean Sturges' book for its avowed purpose in-
heres not in the materials themselves, but in the formidable pedagogical prob-
lem posed by attempting to conduct a sustained comparative analysis of the
security devices considered. While many of the book's numerous provocative
questions are designed to aid in this process,8 they are not likely to prove
wholly adequate. A possible solution may lie in adoption of the problem
method as a major teaching vehicle for such a course.0 Several problems
might be prepared raising the more important questions with which a credi-
tor's lawyer should be concerned in the simpler security transactions-c.g.
rights against third parties, procedures for realizing upon the security, etc. As
each of the several security devices is considered, class discussion could work
out answers and solutions, which in turn could be compared with those de-
veloped in other parts of the course. Such comparative analysis, brought to
bear on a few familiar concrete problems, might at least indicate to the stu-
dent the techniques which can be expected to serve him well in practice.
It may be doubted that a teacher could hope with his first classes to realize
the vast teaching potentialities of this casebook and the method it espouses.
Even failing, he can hope to do a better than average teaching job. The chal-
lenge which Dean Sturges presents is worthy of any law teacher's mettle.
JoHN R. McDONOUGH, JM't
8. See, for example, questions in the footnotes on pp. 116, 345, 507, 705, 790.
9. See the Report of the Committee on Teaching and Examination Methods, HAND-
BOOK OF THE AssocoATiox oF AimucAx LAW ScHoois 85, 86-90 (1942).
t Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford University Law School.
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TnE LI MITIST. By Fred I. Raymond. New York: W. W. Norton & Com-
pany, Inc., 1947. Pp. 166. $2.00.
IN this little book.the author argues the best way to cope with the dual
problem of monopoly and extensive concentration of economic power-a
problem he regards as acute-is to place a precise limit on the size of eco-
nomic enterprises. Hence, the title The Lirnitist. (Limitists don't believe
in "reasonable" speed limits. They believe in fixed maximum speed limits.)
The author then goes further, much further, and by means of two rough-
draft statutes prescribes precise limits to control the maximum size of busi-
ness and industrial enterprises on one hand and enterprises engaged in pro-
ducing agricultural products on the other. For business and industrial enter-
prises the limit used is the number of employees. One thousand employees is
the general limit for enterprises "which deliver to purchasers at more than
one point of delivery." An enterprise which has only one point of delivery
("considered to include actual points which are separated from each other by
more than ten miles") and not jointly owned with others would be free from
a limit on size "so that mass production could be carried on without limit and
without interference." Thus, the limit applies to other than local chains or
groups of business enterprises under common ownership.
For agriculture, less precise, or at any rate, less enduring limits would be
set by production quotas, to be determined by the federal Department of
Agriculture and validated by act of Congress. As I understand them, these
quotas would fix maximum limits on the amounts of production to be assigned
to each individual farm and thus block at a set limit the growth of large-scale
corporate farming. The quotas would, in turn, be so geared that when multi-
plied by the number of farm operations covered they would assure the "de-
sired total production" of the products in question.
Please do not ask me just what the "desired total production" means and I
have a suspicion that Mr. Raymond would prefer not to be asked either. But
the general idea seems to be that it would be a volume of production of farm
products covered by the quota which would assure fair prices, contented small
farmers, and happy urban consumers. In the field of farming the concept
seems somewhat analogous to the notion of full employment Professor A. G.
B. Fisher of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London presents
in his book, International Implications of Full Employment,--i.e., a level of
unemployment which will not "provoke an inconvenient restlessness among
the electorate."
It would, I believe, be rather a simple matter to poke large holes in Mr.
Raymond's limitist formulas. For agriculture particularly the plan seems to
be one which in the process of getting rid of a not very staggering degree of
"big business" among producers, would introduce a myriad of tortuously
complicated controls to be managed by big government. As such, the plan
seems to me to have no palpable merit; and before he gets through thinking
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about it I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Raymond comes to much the same
conclusion.
The absolute one-thousand employee lid on all except local business enter-
prises (utilities are exempted) also readily lends itself to attack as arbitrary
and neglectful of the dictates of economic reason. Apart, however, from in-
volving what would be some terrible complicated corporate unscrambling
operations it does present a simple, clear-cut and readily understandable
remedy for what many sensible people believe to be grave dangers inherent in
tremendous corporate size.
I think there is a way to work out a much better solution than Mr. Ray-
mond proposes. That is to app!y intensively the arts of economic investigation
and analysis (probably developing some new ones along the vay) to the prob-
lems of determining with some degree of precision, case by case and industry
by industry, the relationships between corporate and industrial bulk and eco-
nomic efficiency. Most economists, however, when it is suggested that they
dig into that problem, take to the tall timber, muttering something about
"competition takes care of that" as they depart, and not noting that competi-
tion may also have largely departed in the industries under consideration.
So long as we persist in our ignorance of the precise economic significance
of corporate and industrial size, we have the choice of taking chances on the
social and political dangers which enormous size introduces, or striking them
down with some such meat axe device as that proposed by Mr. Raymond.
And the chances of being able to cope at all effectively with the dangers
decline as they continue to be ignored. Seen in that perspective his plan looks
rather different than it might against a rich background of economic knowledge
which does not now exist.
The jacket of The Linitist states that it "presents a practical solution to the
problems raised by Brandeis, Belloc, and others unwilling to believe that
giantism is the mark of industrial efficiency or economic justice." Hence, it
is perhaps primarily in that dimension-as a solution-that the author would
have it judged. I suspect, however, that some of the more significant parts of
the book are those which analyze the growth of giant business enterprise and
some of its major causes. In this connection, I was particularly interested in
the discussion of taxation as a contributor to "giantism," and in the discrimi-
nating observations about the effect of the antitrust laws and their administra-
tion in maintaining equality among giants.
Contrary to the jacket, I do not believe that The Lingitst has found the
solution for the problems to which it is addressed. However, I respect it for
taking a broad swing at them and in the course of doing so presenting a num-
ber of interesting ideas in consistently lucid prose-a relatively rare attribute
of books concerned with this subject matter. In fact, betveen being an ostrich
and a limitist, I would prefer to be a limitist. However, I would like to avoid
being either one. DxTEa MERRiA, KEET
t Director, Department of Economics, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company; former
President, Reed College.
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THE NRNBERG CASE. By Robert H. Jackson. New York: Alfred A. Xnopf,
1947. Pp. 269. $3.00.
THIS second book on the Nfirnberg trials by the Chief of Counsel for the
United States, like his earlier one,' is primarily a collection of documents
bearing on the proceeding. Some of the materials contained in the first-the
text of the Four Power Agreement, the Charter of the International Tribunal,
and Mr. Jackson's opening statement-are here republished. In addition, this
volume contains his Report to the President of June 7, 1945, his argument to
the court on the legal basis for treating Nazi organizations as criminal, his
closing address, and excerpts from the cross-examination of defendants Her-
mann G6ring, Hjalmar Schacht, Albert Speer and Erhard Milch.
The negotiations which culminated in the indictment of the top Nazi leaders
and organizations as war criminals, and some of the highlights of the trial, are
reviewed in an eighteen page preface. Reconciliation of the conflicting legal
philosophies of the four signatory nations presented some interesting diffi-
culties. Justice Jackson tells us, for example:
". .. It was something of a shock to me to hear the Russian delega-
tion object to our Anglo-American practice as not fair to a defendant.
The point of the observation was this: We indict merely by charging
the crime in general terms and then we produce the evidence at the
trial. Their method requires that the defendant be given, as part of the
indictment, all evidence to be used against him-both documents and
the statements of witnesses. . . . So, while we may think that Con-
tinental procedure puts too much burden of proof on the defendants,
the Anglo-American method seems unfair to them because it does
not inform a defendant of the whole evidence against him. When
we produce it at the trial it may cause surprise and become known
too late to be answered adequately. Our method, it is said, makes a
criminal trial something of a game. This criticism is certainly not
irrational."2
The procedure adopted in the Charter of the Court was prescribed in rela-
tively general terms. It required counsel for defendants, and laid down the
conditions of a fair hearing. Rules of evidence were flexible, the provision
being that any testimony deemed to have probative value be heard. Of the
judges' rulings in the course of trial the author observes: "It is notable that
while there were differences of opinion among them at times, solutions were
found always sufficiently acceptable from the viewpoint of all systems of law
so that no member ever publicly dissented in a matter of procedure or evi-
dence."3
1. THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS (1946).




The United States prosecuting staff carried the burden of establishing the
charge in Count One of a Nazi conspiracy to seize power, establish a totali-
tarian regime, prepare and wage a war of aggression. Witnesses were used
sparingly, the case resting chiefly on about 4,000 captured documents, selected
from over 100,000. At least one defendant indicated a willingness to give evi-
dence against his co-defendants in return for an agreement that in the event
of conviction he would be shot rather than hanged, but the proposition was
rejected. Justice Jackson's explanation affords an interesting contrast to the
tolerated domestic practice of rewarding those who turn State's evidence and
betray their accomplices:
" . .Ay primary objection to using testimony of some defendants
to convict others was that such testimony always would carry the
odor of a bargain. It always would be suspect. . . ."1
All in all, these "first international Criminal Assizes in history" consumed
-216 days of trial time. The prosecutors for the four powers called 33 wit-
nesses in addition to the documentary, photographic and motion picture ex-
hibits. The defendants called 61 witnesses and used interrogatories answered
by 143 more. Nineteen of the defendants took the stand. All save Schacht,
von Papen and Fritsche were convicted. Four Nazi organizations-the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Schutzstaffcbl or SS, the Sichcr-
heitsdienst or SD, and the Gestapo-were likevise adjudicated criminal in
character. The Court declined, however, so to find with respect to the Slur-
mazbteilungen or SA, the Reichscabinet, the General Staff and the High Com-
mand. The Soviet member of the Court dissented from the acquittal of the
three individuals and the failure to find the General Staff and High Command
criminal.
In his final report to the President on October 7, 1946, Justice Jackson rec-
ognized that "We are too close to the trial to appraise its long-range effects." 5
The hope was that the Four Power Agreement and ensuing judicial proceed-
ings had ". . . made explicit and unambiguous what was theretofore, as the
Tribunal has declared, implicit in International Law, namely, that to prepare,
incite, or wage a war of aggression, or to conspire with others to do so, is a
crime against international society, and that to persecute, oppress, or do io-
lence to individuals or minorities on political, racial, or religious grounds in
connection with such a war, or to exterminate, enslave or deport civilian popu-
lations, is an international crime, and that for the commission of such crimes
individuals are responsible."0 Certainly the judgment of the Tribunal consti-
tuted a precedent, with sanctions.
There has been little criticism of the kinds of sanctions applied. Most of
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long fixed terms of imprisonment. Belief in the efficacy of either type of sen-
tence to advance the ends of justice in the more familiar contexts of domestic
administration of criminal law and frequency of resort to them has, of course,
been declining in many countries including Great Britain and the United
States during recent years. But neither of those forms of sanction had been
completely eliminated from the municipal law of the four participating powers
-- or, for that matter, from German law-as of the time in question. In this
situation it was probably inevitable that such sanctions should be applied.7
Debate since8 as well as before9 the event has centered instead on the char-
acter and significance of the precedent. To call the norms by which the de-
fendants were held accountable law and to designate their conduct criminal in
the technical sense has impressed some as a weakening departure from West-
ern democratic principles of mntlla poena sine lege and e.-e post facto.10 Basi-
cally, the question is whether the norms applied at Niirnberg were less crystal-
lized or less widely understood ingredients of the mores. of the international
community, or otherwise significantly different from "the developing morality
of their age" from which Anglo-American judges have been accustomed to
derive and apply principles of municipal law in adjudicating issues unresolved
by legislation. A most thorough exploration of this question with specific
reference to Niirnberg has been published by Professor Glueck.11 Supporting
in final analysis the legality of the proceedings held at Niirnberg, I find it
persuasive. Count One of the indictment, dealing with conspiracy to wage an
aggressive war, obviously presents some of the closest questions. Its wisdom
and the ultimate verdict of legal history will no doubt depend on the extent of
achievement of other international ventures now and in the future. As these
work for or against the development of international order under law they
will reinforce or undermine the rationale on which the Niirnberg judgments
rest.
GEoRGa H. DEssioNt
7. Cf. discussion of punishment and correction in C. XI of GLuECg, WAR CraM-
INALS, TEm PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944).
8. See Biddle, Report to the President, 15 DFP'r SrAa BULL. 954 (1946); Fite,
The Niirnberg Judgment: A Summary 16 id. 9 (1947) ; Glueck, The Nuecrnberg Trial
and Aggressive War, 59 HARv. L. Rav. 396 (1946) ; Wyzanski, Nuremberg in Retrospect,
178 ATL. MONTHLY 56 (Dec. 1946).
9. The various points of view are analyzed in GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 7. See
also the imaginative treatment of the problem in RADIN, THE DAY OF REcxONING (1943).
The original Soviet point of view was elaborated in TRAININ, HITLERiTE RESPONSIBnILITY
UNDER CRIMiNAL LAW (1944).
10. See, e.g., the criticism by Senator Taft reported in N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1946,
§ 1, p. 1, col. 4 and Wyzanski, Dangerous Precedent, 177 ATL. MONTHLY 60 (April, 1946).
For an extended analysis of the meaning and policy of the inlla poena and cx post facto
principles in our law see HALL, PRInCrIPLEs OF CRimINAL LAW C. 2 (1947).
11. GLun , op. cit. supra note 7.
t Lines Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
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ECONOmICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. By Emery Troxel. New York: Rinehart
and Co., 1947. Pp. -xiv, 892. S5.75.
THE present volume, although written as a text for college courses in pub-
lic utility economics, should be of interest to lawyers and administrators as
well as economists. Because of the highly developed controls to which our utility
industries have been subjected, a study of public utilities affords an excellent
,opportunity to study the interaction of economics, politics, administration and
law in a society of private property and private enterprise.
Because of its coverage and emphasis this volume is distinctive in its field.
It discusses most of the problems traditionally included in standard texts with
the exception of the public relations and propaganda activities of the utilities.
To this and the allied problem of the relationship between utility and legisla-
ture little attention is given. The book emphasizes the traditional utilities-
water, urban transportation, gas, electric and telephone-but it also includes a
chapter on radio broadcasting which presents "socially important problems of
service control."' Its uniqueness lies principally in three directions: (1) its
emphasis on the relation of earnings control to investment and its deemphasis
of valuation, (2) its attention to control of the price structure of utilities, and
(3) its concern with problems of multiple-purpose projects. The discussion
of price structures includes several chapters on differential pricing and dis-
crimination, a chapter on proposals for marginal-cost pricing, another chapter
on proposals for cyclical flexibility of utility prices, and finally a comparison
of the theory and practice of pricing by privately owned and publicly owned
utilities. The discussion of multiple-purpose projects, covering four chapters
or about 12% of the volume, is one of the best sections of the book.
The author has shown admirable judgment and balance in his treatment of
the various topics. He has taken considerable care to develop various points
of view on controversial issues and to consider their merits in terms of eco-
nomic, political, administrative and legal problems. Nowhere is this better
illustrated than in his treatment of public ownership, for which he indicates
something of a preference.2
The author believes that regulation of our utilities has been hampered from
the time of Smythe v. A=3ze by undue judicial concern with fair value. But
he has hope for more successful regulation in the wake of the Hope decision.4
"At least it [the Supreme Court] centers attention on the primary question of
reasonable earnings rather than reasonable property values, and is in a good
position to reorient commission behavior in future decisions." He warns,
however, that "our society still is so attached to private property values that
1. P. vii.
2. Pp. vii-ix.
3. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
4. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
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the Court may not be able to keep away from them as further cases come to
it."5
In the regulation of utilities earnings the author believes more attention
should be given to the relation between earnings and investment decisions. He
urges that in setting rates the commissions give greater attention to future
changes in consumer demand and operating costs rather than concentrating as
they do at present on consideration of current and historical costs. Moreover,
he thinks it desirable to develop a method for continuous controf of earnings
which will "turn excess past returns into current price reductions and make
up deficiencies in past returns with current price increases. . . . Under these
conditions a decision of a commissioner, involving either a price increase or a
price reduction, is not final; it is subject to reconsideration as the earnings
experiences of the company unfold in the future."6 Nowhere does the author
consider at length the effect of this or other proposals upon incentives for
efficiency on the part of corporate managers. Yet, inefficiency in the control
of operating costs may contribute more to inflated prices than substantial
increases in the earnings rate.
The author gives considerable attention to utility price structures. This is
a healthy emphasis. In our regulation we have been concerned too much with
insuring absefice of excessive earnings and too little with the effects of prices
on inducing efficiency and allocating our resources. The author believes that
although the companies are not interested in the social effects of their price
structures, the commissions should be.' However, the initiative in developing
price structures has been left to management. "Commissions usually avoid
puzzling relationships of reasbnable earnings and prices, particularly the rela-
tionships of earnings and demand behaviour and alternative choices of price
structures. . . . Controlled by businessmen, the price differentials were based
on private rather than social considerations. Commissions had many chances
to revise these price structures. . . . The regulators neglected this opportu-
nity."
8
In his discussion of proposals to establish prices by equating marginal cost
with price the author notes that while such proposals represent a social stand-
ard of pricing, they have the serious defect of failing to stimulate private
investment in a private enterprise economy.9 Moreover, adoption of such a
scheme is impeded by the problem of measuring marginal costs, by the judicial
concept of reasonable price control, and by the interest of utility commis-
sioners in simple and understandable methods of control. For public plants
he believes that marginal-cost pricing has more to recommend it. However,








"marginal-cost pricing is only another idea of economists that has no political
significance and no evident prospect of political acceptance."' 0
While the author recognizes that legislatures and courts are in part to blame
for the ineffectiveness of our systems of control, he places much of the blame
on the commissioners themselves, especially those of the states. "Practicing
the practical art of politics, the state commissioners are conservative adminis-
trators; they rely on hard facts and old methods of control. ... they seem
usually to manage the control in a clerical and opportunistic manner .... Il
With the gradual extension of federal controls, however, he foresees increas-
ingly effective regulation.
One unique aspect of this volume is the use of tools of modem economic
analysis. I share the author's belief that more effective regulation depends
upon greater understanding of economic issues and that the tools of modern
economic analysis can help increase this understanding. However, I believe
that in his use of these economic tools to illuminate the problems concerned
the author is least successful. The tools must be sharpened more keenly and
given statistical content before either students, administrators or lawyers are
likely to be convinced or enlightened.
The discussion of the economics of price differentials is a striking example
of the problem. Much confusion arises from the author's failure to distin-
guish between alternative services and truly joint services produced from
common resources, and a parallel failure to distinguish between costs common
to alternative services, which can be allocated, and joint-costs of truly joint
services, which cannot be allocated on any defensible economic basis. The au-
thor, in fact, rejects the notion of truly joint services and joint-costs as not
being applicable to utilities.-' Moreover, he proceeds to use the term joint-
costs to refer to cases of true joint-costs (off-peak services) and to common
costs of alternative services. A theoretical analysis of costs for utility pur-
poses, even on static assumptions, must provide at least for a classification of
costs into common, joint and specific and for a subclassification of overhead
and variable. I should also like to urge the need for statistical study of the
costs of utilities under modem conditions. Much discussion of regulatory
problems proceeds on the assumption that most firms are operating under de-
creasing unit costs. The evidence for this seems scanty13
Likewise, the author's distinction between discriminatory and non-discrimi-
natory price differentials is far from adequate. He apparently defines dis-
criminatory differentials as those which are determined by differences in




13. Much discussion of the problems of railroads has also proceeded on a similar
assumption. This assumption has recently been seriously challenged. Cf. HEALY, T=n
EcoNosucs OF TRANSPORTATION 197-3 (1940).
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ences in service costs.' 4 It is a familiar proposition that an unregulated price
of a manufacturing industry will normally be determined by both demand and
cost, or more specifically by marginal revenue and marginal cost. Discrimina-
tory prices are no exception.' 5 In technical terms discrimination means some
difference in the degree of monopoly power exercised in different sales.10 It
is not true to say that costs do not enter into a seller's calculation in setting
discriminatory prices. Likewise in the case of truly joint products there may
be, even in the absence of any monopoly elements, price differentials resulting
from differences in demand. Such differentials would not ordinarily be con-
sidered discriminatory, although the author's definition suggests that they are.
Other questions might be raised concerning the treatment of the theory of
marginal-cost pricing. While I do not disagree with the author's conclusions
concerning the inappropriateness of the proposal as a guide for regulating
privately owned utilities, I do not believe he has represented the theory ade-
quately. He points out correctly that the problem is complicated by the ques-
tion of whether to consider the plant as given or as variable, and consequently
whether to operate with long-run or short-run marginal cost.1" He then pro-
ceeds to assume that the plant is given and the regulatory authority operates
on short-run marginal cost. I venture the opinion that this is not what the
proponents of marginal-cost pricing have in mind. Marginal-cost pricing is a
derivative of static analysis in which the problem of the difference between
the long-run and short-run marginal cost does not arise. This has without
doubt given rise to considerable confusion. However, the purpose of the pro-
ponents of marginal-cost pricing is the ideal allocation of resources, plant and
equipment as well as materials and labor.
These examples will serve to illustrate the difficulties arising from the use
of the tools of modern economic analysis for solution of regulatory problems
in the present volume. In part the difficulty arises from trying to transfer an
analysis and geometry applicable to a single service firm to a multiple service
firm. In part it arises from inadequate definition and classification of costs on
a theoretical level. Finally, it arises from an attempt to apply a pricing theory,
adequate to deal with problems under static conditions, to dynamic conditions.
The first two of these sources of difficulty can be solved by applying more
adequate tools which are at hand. The solution to the third source of difficulty
is not so clear.
JOHN PERR MILLrRt
14. P. 570.
15. See RoiNsoN, EcoNouics oF Im1P'FEcr CoMPEImoN C. 15 (1933); BOULDINa,
EcoNomic ANALYSIS 540-6 (1941).
16. See MILLn, UNFAIR CoPmmTION 122-5 (1941).
17. Pp. 447-8.
t Associate Professor of Economics, Yale University.
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